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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRI-MINAL LAW AND
PROCEDUIE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD

ARREST.

People v. Preuss, Mich., 195 N. W. 684. Arrest and seizure made by misuse
of search warrant not justified on theory of offense committed in ofcer's
presence.
The court having taken the position (see same case under Searches and
Seizures) that intoxicating liquor. seized on defendant's premises by an officer
conducting a search under a warrant authorizing search for certain stolen beans
was inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, the prosecution contended that the arrest could be justified on
the theory that the officer being lawfully in the building to search for the beans
could arrest for, and seize evidence 9 f, an offense being committed in his
presence. Held, the contention was untenable.
The court distinguishes this type of case where the officer's entry is originally by virtue of a warrant with a mandate to search only for evidence of
crime A, in which ,case evidence of a totally different offense, B, may not be
seized, and the case where the officer's original entry is authorized not by a
warrant, but by his duty to arrest for crime A actually being committed in his
presence, in which case, being lawfully on the premises he may arrest for and
seize evidence of crime B. In the former case to allow the arrest for, and seizure
of evidence of crime B would violate the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures while in the latter case no such right is
violated. The court cites as illustrative of this latter type of case People v.
Woodward, Mich., 190 N. W. 721, where officers entered a residence to quell a
noisy -brawl amounting to a disturbance of the peace, held that the arrest of
inmates of the house for violation of the prohibition laws and seizure of intoxicating liquor in the house as evidence were justifiable.
BREACH OF THE PEACE.

State v. Steger, W. Va., 119 S. E. 682. Mere use -of abusive, profane
and insulting language not a common law breach of the peace.
Buchner and his two boys were passing defendant's house near a public
highway, the defendant claiming that they were trespassing on his property.
He then called to them in a loud voice and in an insulting manner: "Get up on
the road you God damned thieving son of a bitch." No one except Buchner
and his two boys were within hearing distance. Held, there were insufficient
facts to constitute the common law offense of breach of the peace.
The decision, while recognizing that the use of insulting, profane, and
provocative words under other circumstances might amount to the common law .
offense, rested its decision in the principal case upon the grounds: (1) that
the words used involved no threat of violence on the part of the speaker nor
were they under the circumstances (defendant was some distance away from B
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when he called to him and B made no effort to retaliate) provocative of any
immediate affray; (2) the public peace was not disturbed since no one except
the three persons heard the language. The authorities cited by the court sustain
in general the position taken. (See in addition, language of the text in 9 C. 3.,
p. 338, and for a partial collection of the cases see note to People v. Johnson, 13
L. R. A. 163.)
Statutes and ordinances have been enacted in some states and municipalities
extending the scope of the common law offense and making penal the uttering of
profane, obscene or insulting language under circumstances that would fall short
of the common law offense. For example, the Georgia statute makes the use of
profane language without provocation in the presence of a female a misdemeanor. (Foster v. State, 43 S. E. 436.) A New Hampshire statute (Pub. St.
C. 264, par. 2) made it unlawful "to address any offensive, derisive or annoying
words to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place."
(State v. McConnel, 70 N. H. 294.) A Connecticut statute made it unlawful for
any person to break the peace "by following or mocking any person with scurrilous or abusive or indecent language or gestures." An Arkansas statute
(Mansf. Dig. 1880) made it an offense "to profanely swear and curse." Held,
in Bodenhamer v. State (28 S. W. 507) upon demurrer brought to an indictment under this statute, that in order to constitute the offense it was unnecessary
that the language be used publicly. Calling a man "a damned fool and a
bastard" was held to constitute an offense under sec 22 of a municipal ordinance
of the City of Topeka enacting that if any person "shall disturb the quiet of
the city, he shall be punished, etc." (City of Topeka v. Heitman, 28 Pac. 1096.)
In ex parte Delaney (43 Cal. 478) (1872) petitioner had been convicted
under a municipal ordinance of the City of San Francisco prohibiting "the utterance of profane language, words or epithets in the'hearing of two or more
persons." On application for habeas corpus he contended, inter alia, that since
profane swearing was indictable at common law and since there 'as a California
statute making "every act or offense not defined by statute which is a misdemeanor at common law is a misdemeanor in this state," that it was, therefore,
not competent for the Board of Supervisors of the city, under any authority
given them by law to reduce or in any manner change the penalty which the
statute has declared upon a conviction of a common law misdemeanor. The
court disposed of this contention by holding that the acts complained of were
not indictable at common law. "The words charged to have been uttered by
the petitioner

.

.

.

were not blasphemous within the definition given nor

within any definition which we have seen, nor do they appear to have been
uttered under such circumstances as to constitute a case of public profane
swearing."
BRaRY.

Scott v. State, Ohio, 141 N. E. 19. "Valuable thing" within bribery statute.
Surrender of virtue by a woman in return for police protection in illicit
traffic in intoxicating liquors held a "valuable thing" within bribery statute.
Under section 12823, General Code, "whoever, being . . . a state or other

officer beneficial thing to influence him with respect to his official duty," is
guilty of a felony. A substantial favor asked by a public official in return for
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the official's promise to give protection in illicit traffic in intoxicating liquors is
a "valuable thing" within the meaning of the statute.
CONSPIRACY.

United States v. Walter, 44 Sup. Ct. Repr. -10. Constitutionality of statute
forbidding conspiracy to defraud a corporationin which the United States holds
stock.
Act Oct. 23, 1918, amending Criminal Code, Sec. 35 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp.,
1919, Sec. 10199), making it an offense to present or obtain* payment of a
fraudulent claim against any corporation in which the United States is a stockholder, is constitutional, as it refers only to corporations7 like the United States
Emergency Fleet Corporation, that are instrumentalities of the government.
ESCAPE.

Wiggins v. State, Ind., 141 N. E. 56. Criminal intent.
Evidence of a departure from the state farm under permission of an officer,
who had no authority to grant such permission, with an alleged intent to return,
held sufficient to sustain a conviction under Acts 1915, c. 101, Sec. 1 (Burns'
Ann. St. Supp., 1921, Sec. 2406a), providing "that any person sentenced to the
Indiana state farm, who shall escape therefrom, . . . shall be deemed guilty
of a felony.

Criminal is not an essential element of this offense.
EVIDENCE.

Maddox v. State, Texas, 254 S. W. 800. Evidence of experiment made day
after the killing admissable.
Defendant was on trial for murder. The state offered testimony of one
Birch, who had seen deceased's body lying in defendant's yard shortly after the
killing, to the effect that on the day following the killing he and one Wakefield
went to the place, that he had Wakefield stand at the place where the body
lay and that he, Birch, went inside the house, took a gun and pointed it toward
Wakefield and sighted through a certain hole in the wall along the gun barrel
and from such a position it could be aimed at a point on Wakefield's breast and
shoulder similar to the one on the body of deceased penetrated by the buckshot.
Held, the evidence was admissible. Assuming the similarity of the conditions of the experiment to the ultimate fact which the state wished to prove,
viz.: that defendant shot deceased from his own house, the case is correct,
Experiments made before the jury in open court, are commonly admitted.
See Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 1160, for discussion and illustrative cases. In the
principal case, however, the experiment was not made in open court or before
the jury, but by a witness outside of court who now merely relates the result of
his experiment: On principle, however, assuming the similarity of the conditions
of the experiment, and the qualification of the witness, it should be none the
less admissible. Wigmore's Evidence, See. 45. State v. Nagle, 54 Atl. 1063
(R. I.), where it was held, in a case where it became necessary to determine
from the nature of a powder burn around the wound the position in which the
revolver was held when fired, that an expert on gunshot wounds could testify
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as to experiments he had made with 32 calibre revolvers to determine the nature
of the powder burn produced by them.
The possible objection to the admissibility of such evidence (which, however, was not made in the principal case, viz.: that it is ex parte testimony and
that no notice is given to the defense that the experiment was to be conducted
and hence no opportunity for cross examination, is clearly without merit. Wigmore, Sec. 1385, sub. 3. For the experiment itself is not testimony, "it is
nothing until adopted by a competent witness as a part of his testimony and a
mode of communication," and at that time, of course, full opportunity for cross
examination is afforded.
State v. Royall, W. Va., 119 S. E. 801. Proof by the records of former
conviction essential where made the basis for an additional penalty.
Where defendant is indicted under a statute imposing a greater penalty for
a "second" violation of the prohibition law, the former conviction must be
proved by the introduction of the record and it is reversible error to allow thF
clerk and the judge of the circuit who presided at the former trial to testify as
to that fact.
HomiciDE.
Moore v. State, Okla., 218 Pac. 1102. Defense of relative: withdrawal.
If one enters a conflict to defend a relative and afterwards abandons his
plan to defend such relative and himself withdraws in good faith 'from such
conflict and is thereafter pursued, his right to defend himself from the latter
attack is complete, although the relative to whose aid he first entered the conflict has not'withdrawn therefrom.
People v, Creasy, N. Y., 140 N. E. 563. Permitting evidence to remain with
jury after its falsity is knownt to district attorney.
In a prosecution for murder where a letter had been introduced in evidence
on testimony that it was in the handwriting of deceased, and thereafter a witness was permitted to testify to the contents of a post card which she had seen
and which she claimed was in the same handwriting as the letter, which testimony was substantially the only evidence that deceased broke her engagement
with defendant, which was claimed as the motive for the crime, it was error
requiring reversal for the district attorney to permit that evidence to remain in
the record after he had conclusive knowledge that the letter was not written by
deceased.
Pound and Crane, JJ., dissenting.
INSANITY.

Travis v. State, Ark., 254 S. W. 464. Legal Tests for Insanity. Mental
disease making one incapable of choosing between right and wrong, a defense.
Defendant who was prosecuted for murder, interposed the defense of insanity. The trial court in purporting to define the legal tests of insanity gave
two tests joined by the conjunction "and," thus instructing in effect that before
the defendant could be excused it must appear not only that she was in such a
condition when the deed was committed as not to know the consequences of the
act, but also that she did not know right from wrong. Such instruction was
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held to be erroneous, for it ignores the legal 'test that even assuming the
defendant knew the nature and quality of the act and that it was wrong, but
"was under such duress of mental disease as to be incapable of choosing between
right and wrong, there should be an acquittal.
JUiDGMENT.

" State, ex rel. Reid v. District Court, Mont., 218 Pac. 558. Power of trial
court to modify judgment.
Though a court may amend a judgment to express what was actually decided, it cannot set aside or modify it, so as to change rights fixed by it, except
of motion for new trial; it being necessary to seek the appellate court for other
relief from the judgment.
An order of the trial court, made eight days after final judgment of sentencewas pronounced, and in process of execution, attempting, under Rev. Codes,
1921, Sec. 12078, to suspend and reduce punishment, held void, 'as having been
made in excess of court's jurisdiction, and as an attempt to exercise power
which Const., Art. 7, Sec. 9, reposed in the governor and the board of pardons.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
People v. Preuss, Mich., 195 N. W. 684. Warrant authorizing search for and
seizure of beans does not authorize seizure of unlawfully possessed liquor.
Where a sheriff went upon the defendant's premises with a warrant authorizing search for and seizure if found, of certain stolen beans and while upon
the premises discovered in one of the defendant's bedrooms a quantity of moonshine whisky which he~seized, at the same time arresting the defendant for
unlawful possession of liquor, held that the officer in thus seizing the liquor
was a trespasser, the arrest for the unlawful possession was unjustifiable and
the liquor seized inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution for the unlawful
possession thereof.
That an officer exceeding the limit of the mandate of the warrant under
which he acts either as to the place to be searched or thing to be seized becomes
a trespasser is well established (2 R. C. L. 709, 24 R. C. L 714, cited by the
court). As to the admissibility, however, of evidence illegally obtained there is
conflict of authority. (On this latter point see note on the recent case of Giles
v. United States, 284 Fed. 208, in. vol. 14, No. 1, American Journal Criminal
Law, page 123.)

